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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3)
Typicality Requirement: The Superfluous Prerequisite
to Maintaining a Class Action
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains four prere-
quisites to bringing a class action.' A prospective class representative must
satisfy each prerequisite-numerosify, commonality, typicality, and repre-
sentativeness-to maintain a class action in federal court. Most courts, how-
ever, have either ignored the 23(a)(3) typicality requirement or have equated it
with other provisions in rule 23 .2 Few courts or commentators have acknowl-
edged the existence of any independent meaning of the typicality pre-
requisite.3
This Comment will review the historical background of the typicality
requirement and the treatment of the requirement by courts and commen-
tators.5 The Comment will also review and criticize attempts to attribute
independent significance to the typicality requirement.6
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
When the preliminary draft of the modem Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure was promulgated in 1936, it contained no single rule governing class
actions.7 Proposed rules 26 and 27 concerned compulsory and permissive
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 provides in part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representa-
tive parties on behalf of all only if(l) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impractic-
able, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
partids will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. (b) Class Actions Maintainable. An
action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would
create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B)
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
2. See text accompanying notes 32-97 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 98-112 infra.
4. For a general discussion of the problems of previous equitable remedies that class actions were created
to remedy, see Z. CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY (1950) and W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
553 (1930). See text accompanying notes 22-31 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 32-112 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 113-116 infra.
7. See Rules of Civil Procedure For The District Courts of The United States And The Supreme Court of
The District of Columbia (Preliminary Draft 1936).
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joinder, but dealt sparsely with the class action." Professor James W. Moore?
felt that the law governing class actions was already in a confused state,
largely because class actions were viewed as inextricably bound up with
jurisdiction and because of the question of the binding effect of a class action
judgment.'0 As a result, he urged the acceptance of a separate rule for class
actions." His proposal, which introduced the famous "true," "hybrid," and
"spurious" classes, 2 was accepted, with modifications, as rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The modified version provided:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be
sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class
is:
(1) Joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
and a common relief is sought.'
3
The first rule 23, however, created only confusion about the law of class
actions. The rule had at least three major problems. 4 First, it perpetuated the
problem of the binding effect of a class action on absent class members. The
rule contained no express language regarding absent class members, leaving
courts to face the same problems they had encountered under previous equity
rules. 15 Ironically, Professor Moore's tentative draft of rule 23 had included
the following section:
(b) Effect of Judgment. The judgment rendered in the first situation [true] is
conclusive upon the class; in the second situation [hybrid] it is conclusive upon all
parties and privies to the proceeding, and upon all claims whether presented in the
proceeding or not, insofar as they do or may affect specific property involved in
the proceeding; and in the third situation [spurious] it is conclusive upon only the
parties and privies to the proceeding.'
6
8. Id. at 44-48.
9. Professor Moore served as special research assistant to the Supreme Court's drafting committee for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He continues to be a leading American scholar of federal civil procedure and
jurisdiction.
10. See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised By the Preliminary Draft, 25
GEO. L.J. 551 (1937).
11. Id.
12. When a right was joint, common, or derivative, it was considered a "true" class action. When the right
was joint and specific property was involved, the action was deemed to be "hybrid." When the right was several
and there were common questions of law or fact that predominated, the action was a "spurious" class action.
See Moore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised By the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. LJ.
551, 572-76 (1937). The terms "joint," "common," and "several" were quite ambiguous, and the courts had
considerable difficulty with these terms. See 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACrIONS § 1216 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
NEWBERG].
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 308 U.S. 663, 689 (1939).
14. See NEWBERG, supra note 12, § 1216 at 316.
15. Id.
16. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO.
L.J. 551, 571 (1937).
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Nevertheless, the drafters failed to include this section in the final draft of rule
23, a failure attributable to the belief that the effect of judgment was a matter
of substance and not one of procedure. 17 The drafters stated, "The Commit-
tee consider it beyond their function to deal with the question of the effect of
judgments on persons who are not parties."' 8
The second major problem with rule 23 was the difficulty courts had in
determining whether a case fit into the "true," "hybrid," or "spurious"
category.' 9 For example, one commentator noted this difficulty in a discus-
sion of Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp. :
2
[P]laintiffs claimed that their suit on behalf of defrauded creditors was "hybrid"
and defendant contended it was "spurious." The district court said merely that it
was a "class bill."..... In the course of reversing, the court of appeals classified it
as "spurious."... The Supreme Court decided it was maintainable but gave it no
name.... The case returned to the district court, which decided it was
"hybrid." . . . When it came again to the court of appeals, the court said "names
are not important."-
21
The final problem with original rule 23 was its lack of safeguards to assure
procedural fairness in a class action. For example, no provision was made to
accord notice to the class members. Courts were left to fashion their own
rules regarding notice.
Because of these problems, rule 23 was amended in 1966, thereby taking
its present form." To provide more manageable standards,23 the Advisory
Committee eliminated the "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" distinctions and
added provisions concerning notice and the binding effects of a class action.24
The numerosity and commonality requirements of rule 23(a)25 were consistent
with Equity Rules of 1842 and 1912,26 and the adequate representation re-
quirement of rule 23(a)(4) had made its first formal appearance in original rule
23.27 Also with this revision, the typicality requirement made its appearance.
Prior to the 1966 revision, the typicality issue had arisen only when courts
28were deciding whether a "spurious" class action could be maintained. In
17. See Moore and Cohn, Federal Class Actions - Jurisdiction & Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555
(1938).
18. Id. at 556.
19. See NEWBERG, supra note 12, § 1216 at 316.
20. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
21. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1752, at 512 n.39
(citations omitted) (1972).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 95 (1966).
23. FED. R. CIv. P. 23, Advisory Committee Note.
24. Id.
25. See note I supra.
26. Rules of Practice For the Courts of Equity of the United States, Rule 48,42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi. (1843),
provided:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest inconvenience
and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with
making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent
all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such
cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
See also Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, Rule 38, 226 U.S. 627, 659 (1912).
27. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
28. See 7 C.WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1764 at 611 (1972).
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order to decide, a court had first to determine whether the common questions
of law or fact of the class were predominant in the action. Whether or not a
claim was "typical" was a crucial part of this determination.
The Committee, however, failed to explain the addition of the typicality
requirement.29 One member of the Advisory Committee later noted that the
Committee did not begin its work with the notion that typicality would be a
separate prerequisite to bringing a class action.30 He pointed out that the main
purpose of the clause was to ensure that the interests of those representing a
class were "squarely aligned" with those of the represented group.3' How-
ever, the Committee's failure to explain the addition of the typicality require-
ment has only contributed to confusion in applying and interpreting the re-
quirement.
II. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE TYPICALITY REQUIREMENT:
No INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE
Most courts and commentators have taken the position that the rule
23(a)(3) typicality requirement has no independent significance,32 and Profes-
sor Moore asserts that "there is no need for this clause, since all meanings
attributable to it duplicate requirements prescribed by other provisions in
Rule 23. ,33 The following discussion reviews and analyzes some approaches
utilized in treating the typicality prerequisite.
A. Analogy to Rule 23(a)(2) Commonality Requirement
Typicality has often been equated with the commonality requirement of
rule 23(a)(2), which provides that one may maintain a class action if "there are
questions of law or fact common to the class." 34 In Satterwhite v. City of
Greenville,35 for example, the court adopted this approach. The plaintiff was a
woman who applied for the position of municipal airport manager for the City
of Greenville, Texas. After not being hired for the position, she filed a sex
discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.36 She
sought to represent a class composed of present and prospective female em-
ployees alleged to be victims of the defendant's discriminatory hiring and
employment practices. The court refused to certify the case as a class action,
largely because of a conflict of interest. The court held that the defendant was
justified in not hiring the plaintiff since her husband was both a prime user and
tenant at the airport. The court concluded, "[Tihe conflict of interest issue
29. Id. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Advisory Comm. Note).
30. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967).
31. Id. at 387 n.120.
32. Note, Federal Civil Procedure--Class Actions-Rule 23(a)(3) Typicality Requirement Has Inde-
pendent Meaning, 25 KAN. L. REV. 126, 129 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Class Actions].
33. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.06-2, at 23-185 (2d ed. 1980).
34. See note I supra. See, e.g., Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 17 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
35. 395 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
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unique to this case vitiates both the commonality of law and fact questions
and the typicality of the claims and defenses. ' 37 Because the plaintiff failed to
establish a nexus between her claims and those of the proposed class, her
claims could be neither common nor typical of the class.
The opinion in Gibbs v. Titelmana8 followed this like treatment of the
commonality and typicality prerequisites. In that case, the plaintiff sought to
have declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statutory scheme for the re-
possession of motor vehicles pursuant to conditional sales contracts. The
plaintiff contended that the suit should proceed as a class action on the part of
both plaintiffs and defendants, with the plaintiffs being those who had had
their cars repossessed under the statutory scheme, and the defendants being
those who had a license to repossess and had repossessed cars. Using similar
criteria in finding that the typicality and commonality requirements were
satisfied, the court allowed the case to proceed as a class action. The court
stated, "That there is a common question of law is... clear. The validity of
the statutory scheme relating to the repossession of motor vehicles, as it
pertains to both classes, comprises the substance of this action."39 The court
concluded that the typicality requirement had been met, finding that the
issues relating to the statutory scheme "[were] necessarily typical of the
claims and defenses of each class." 4
This treatment of rule 23(a)(3) by the courts in Gibbs and Satterwhite is
understandable. If the claim of a litigant contains common questions of law
and fact, it would be difficult indeed to then determine that the claim is not
typical of the class. Logic suggests that the two are virtually the same.
4
'
Consequently, the rationale for having a typicality requirement is quite un-
clear.42
A class representative's claim has also been said to be typical "if it arises
from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to claims
of other class members, and his or her claims are based on the same legal
theory.,43 This approach to typicality simply merges the requirement with
commonality and eliminates the need for a separate requirement. Using this
approach, the court in Rakes v. Coleman 4 stated, "The second requirement
[typicality] in effect restates the first [commonality]." 45 The plaintiff in that
case was attacking a Virginia practice by which officials confined alcoholics
for "treatment and rehabilitation." Since all alcoholics were given the same
37. 395 F. Supp. 698, 701 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
38. 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
39. Id. at 52.
40. Id.
41. "Common" is defined as "'belonging equally to two or more; shared by all alike; joint." THE
AMIERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 268 (1969). "Typical" is defined as "ex-
hibiting the traits or characteristics peculiar to its kind, class, group, or the like." Id. at 1388.
42. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
43. NEWBERG, supra note 12, § 1115b at 185.
44. 318 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1970).
45. Id. at 190.
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treatment, it followed that the defendants' action toward the plaintiff was
common to all alcoholics who had been treated under the provision.
Likewise, in determining that the prerequisites for bringing a class action
had been met, the court in Adderly v. Wainwright4 found that an attack by the
plaintiff on the Florida death penalty and Florida capital punishment cases
provided "questions of law or fact common to the class, and which [were]
typical of the claims of the class." 47 The plaintiff purported to represent more
than fifty prisoners who had been subjected to those practices. Since all the
class members had been sentenced under the Florida death penalty statute,
they shared "common questions of law and fact." Although the prisoners
may have received the death penalty for varying reasons, one prisoner's claim
could still be found typical because all faced the same fate. Because of the
treatment of typicality in Adderly and like cases,4 it can be seen that the
typicality requirement merely duplicates the commonality requirement.
B. Analogy to Rule 23(a)(4) Adequate Representation Requirement
Subsection (a)(4) of rule 23 provides that a class action may be maintain-
ed if the representative parties will "fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class." 49 This provision is premised on the idea that an individual
adequately represents the class when his interests are aligned with those of
the class members. 0 Consequently, a class representative will adequately
represent a class if, in pursuing his interests through litigation, the class's
interests will also be furthered. There has been considerable confusion among
the courts,5' however, in defining the typicality requirement so as to keep it
separate from the adequate representation requirement.52 The apparent
reasoning is that it is logical that an individual's claims are "typical of those of
the class if his interests are aligned with those of the class members."
A prime example of this reasoning can be seen in the Second Circuit
decision in Inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller. 3 The
inmates of Attica, a New York state penal instiution, sought an injunction
against any interrogation of inmates with regard to the September 1971 upris-
ing there. The court found that the commonality requirement had been met
because all the inmates would be subject to interrogation. It held, however,
that the plaintiff's claims were by no means typical, pointing out that
[s]ome [inmates] did not participate at all in the uprising, while others did. Some
may be threatened with state prosecution, while others will not. Some, therefore,
46. 46 F.R.D. 97 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
47. Id. at 98.
48. See also Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1968); Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50
F.R.D. 242, 247 (D. Conn. 1970).
49. See note 1 supra.
50. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
51. See, e.g., Vernon J. Rockler and Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335 (D. Minn. 1971).
52. See Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical And Representative Plaintiff Under Subsections (a)(3)
and (4) of Federal Rule 23, 53 B.U.L. REV. 406, 409 (1973).
53. 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
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may be called upon to testify with respect to criminal acts committed by others,
and may even desire to do so, while others may desire the opposite.'
Therefore, the court held, the interests of one group could not be adequately
represented by members of another. The court's analysis appears quite valid.
Indeed, if an individual's interests are not aligned with those of the class, then
logically his interests are not "typical" of those of the class.
In applying the rule 23(a)(4) requirement, some courts have simply ignor-
ed the typicality requirement. For example, in duPont v. Perot,55 a breach of
fiduciary duty and common law fraud case, the court stated, "Since 23(a)(3)
has been equated with the 23(a)(4) requirement .... discussion of both sub-
divisions will be conducted under 23(a)(4). ' 5 6 Although the court said it
would consider subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) together, it simply examined
whether the adequate representation requirement had been met and an-
nounced that "the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) and (4) [had] not
been met.",
57
Significantly, the courts have utilized a variety of standards in this line of
cases equating subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) to determine whether a class
action is appropriate. One commentator has grouped these approaches into
three categories: the "benefit" test, the "no conflict" test, and the "exact
equation" test 8 Under the "benefit" test, a plaintiff's claim meets both the
typicality and adequate representation requirements if the proposed class will
benefit from the action. The well-known case of Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin59 falls into this category. In Eisen, which involved a proposed class
of nearly four million odd-lot buyers on the New York Stock Exchange, the
court found the typicality requirement satisfied, stating, "Although there are
varying fact patterns underlying each individual odd-lot transaction, the same
allegedly unlawful differential is charged to all buyers and sellers .... [and]
all members of the class... will be helped if the rates are found to be exces-
sive." 60 Examining the rule 23(a)(4) requirement, the court concluded that
adequate representation, when read with "coextensive" interest,61 "amounts
to little more than an alternative way of stating that the plaintiff's claim must
be typical of those of the entire class . ... 62
The "no conflict" test requires that there be no conflict between the
claims of the class representative and those of the class. If there is no conflict,
unlike the situation in the Attica case,63 the court will conclude that the
plaintiff's claim must be typical and that he will fairly represent the interests
54. Id. at 24.
55. 59 F.R.D. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
56. Id. at 409.
57. Id. at 412.
58. See Class Actions, supra note 32, at 130-32.
59. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
60. Id. at 562.
61. See text accompanying notes 72-82 infra.
62. 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
63. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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of all class members. In Weiss v. Tenney Corp.,64 the court took the position
that typicality means "only that plaintiff not have interests in conflict with
those of the other members of the class." 65 The plaintiff brought an action
under the Securities Act of 193366 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193467
alleging fraud and misrepresentation in the issuance of Tenney stock. Since all
purchasers of the Tenney stock had relied on the same material misstatements
and would have to offer proof of the same nature to support their claims, the
court concluded, "Insofar as plaintiff relies on section 11 [of the Securities
Act of 1933] to gain recovery, his interests are not in any manner adverse to or
in conflict with others in the same class." 68
To meet the "exact equation" test, one must positively show that he can
adequately represent the interests of the class. This approach differs from the
"no conflict" test in that it places a heavier burden on the plaintiff to show
that his claims are in fact typical and that he will adequately represent the
class. 69 Mudd v. Busse7 illustrates the application of this test. The case in-
volved an action brought by pretrial state court detainees seeking to maintain
a class action against all Indiana judicial officers who had denied or would
deny release to individuals prior to conviction solely for inability to post
bond. The court found that typicality is merely a facet of the adequate repre-
sentation requirement, stating:
In the case of nontypical claims or defenses generally, the Rule 23(a)(3) require-
ment shades over into the 23(a)(4) requirement of fair and adequate representation
of the class .... Where there is indication that the representative may be partic-
ularly interested in a claim or defense unique to him or a subclass, the court is
justified in denying class action certification on the grounds of inadequate repre-
sentation. 71
Under this approach, the typicality and adequate representation requirements
are met in the same instance.
All three standards, however, appear to be variations of the "co-exten-
sive" interest approach to satisfying the 23(a)(4) adequate representation re-
72quirement. Under this approach, one may maintain a class action if his
interests are "co-extensive" with those of the other class members and no
antagonistic interests are present. The opinion in Robertson v. National
Basketball Association73 is representative of those in which courts have rec-
ognized the interrelationship between typicality and adequate representation
and have resolved the two together. In Robertson, player representatives of
64. 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
65. Id. at 290.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976) (as amended).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976) (as amended).
68. 47 F.R.D. 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
69. See Class Actions, supra note 32, at 132.
70. 68 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
71. Id. at 529.
72. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1764, at 612 (1972).
73. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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National Basketball Association and American Basketball Association teams
brought an antitrust action against the two basketball leagues. The plaintiffs
sought to represent all NBA and ABA players, alleging that the reserve
clause, uniform player contracts, and the college draft violated antitrust
laws. 74 Holding that the action could proceed as a class action, the court
found that the requirements of subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) "are virtually the
same .... to wit, the interests of the named plaintiffs must be co-extensive
with the interests of the proposed class members, and the plaintiff's interests
may not be antagonistic or adverse to the interests of the class." 75
The "co-extensive" interest approach seems to suggest that to satisfy the
typicality and adequate representation requirements, the plaintiff's claims
must be "identical" to those of absent class members.76 However, as one
commentator noted, "To the extent that 'co-extensive' might suggest that the
representatives' claims must be substantially identical to those of absent class
members, it is too demanding a standard. Quite properly, a number of courts
have taken a more permissive approach to Rule 23(a)(3)." 77 Several courts
have found the "co-extensive" interest approach satisfied even though the
facts relating to class members varied. In Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,78 for example, the plaintiff sought to represent all common stock share-
holders who had sold their stock to defendant in reliance on a press release
allegedly prepared with reckless disregard for the consequences. The court
allowed the action to proceed as a class action, using the "co-extensive"
interest approach to satisfy rule 23(a)(3) and (a)(4) requirements. It found that
the plaintiff's interests were "co-extensive" with those of the other class
members even though different fact patterns had led individual class members
to sell their stock. Because the defendant's fraudulent motives were found
to be pervasive, the variation in fact patterns was held irrelevant. 79
Other courts have used the "co-extensive" interest approach to satisfy
subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4), even where there would be a disparity in the
damages the class members would receive. In Vuyanich v. Republic National
Bank of Dallas,80 persons allegedly aggrieved by the defendant's employment
practices were allowed to represent other class members who suffered from
different practices entitling them to a different measure of damages. The
typicality and adequate representation requirements were met as the court
found there was a sufficient nexus among the practices because each class
member's suffering was a result of the same animus."'
74. Id. at 873.
75. Id. at 898.
76. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIvIL § 1764, at 612 (1972).
77. Id.
78. 47 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
79. Id. at 63.
80. 78 F.R.D. 352 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
81. Id. at 356.
1981]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Thus, in determining whether the "co-extensive" interest test has been
satisfied in meeting the typicality and adequate representation requirements,
the courts have looked at "(1) Whether the interests of the named plaintiff are
'co-extensive' with the interests of the proposed class; (2) whether his
interests are in any way antagonistic to the interests of the proposed class;
and (3) any other facts bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for
the class.",82 The equation of typicality to adequate representation in the
"co-extensive" approach is comprehensible. Both prerequisites place an
overlapping requirement on a prospective class member to ensure that the
rights of class members will be adequately protected.
C. Analogy to Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance of Common Questions Require-
ment.
To maintain a class action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
one must satisfy the conditions of one of the subsections of rule 23(b)' in
addition to all the conditions of rule 23(a). The typicality requirement has also
been associated with the rule 23(b)(3) condition that a class action is appropri-
ate if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.... "84 Therefore, a court must compare and contrast the claims of
the class representative with those of the class under both subsections (a)(3)
and (b)(3). Examining a class representative's claim to determine whether it is
"typical" would necessarily involve consideration of some of the same factors
to determine whether class questions predominate over individual claims.
If one equates typicality with the rule 23(a)(2) commonality require-
ment, s for example, one must determine whether a proposed class represen-
tative's claims are typical or common of the class. If the representative's
claims are found typical under this approach, then little will be required in
meeting the requisites of subsection (b)(3); 86 one need only determine whether
the questions common to the class outweigh any individual's claim. On the
other hand, if one equates typicality with the adequate representation require-
ment87 and uses the "co-extensive" interest approach, then more should be
required to satisfy subsection (b)(3).8 Satisfying the former will not neces-
sarily involve deciding whether any common questions are present at all.
Under subsection (b)(3), one still must ascertain whether there are common to
all class members questions that predominate over any underlying interest.
Finally, if typicality means that a representative's claims must be "identical"
to those of the class, then the need for (b)(3) is obviated. For if a plaintiff's
82. See duPont v. Perot, 59 F.R.D. 404, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
83. See note I supra.
84. Id.
85. See text accompanying notes 34-48 supra.
86. See Class Actions, supra note 32, at 133.
87. See text accompanying notes 49-82 supra.
88. See Class Actions, supra note 32, at 133.
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claim is identical to those of the class, then common questions do predomi-
nate over any other.
Since the typicality requirement must first be met before a proposed class
action can be analyzed under subsection (b)(3), some courts89 have equated
the two to avoid displacing or heightening the "predominance of common
questions" requirement.90 In effect, however, they have displaced the typical-
ity requirement. For example, in Swanson v. American Consumer Indus-
tries,9 the plaintiff brought an action on behalf of himself and all other similar-
ly situated stockholders to enjoin the sale of a dissolved corporation's assets
to the defendant and to rescind a reorganization agreement between those
companies. The district court held that the class action could not be main-
tained because the plaintiff's claims were not typical of the class.92 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the claim was typical since it involved
the central question of alleged deceptive practices common to all stockhold-
ers. 93 The court went on to find that the common issues predominated, stat-
ing:
[S]ome minority shareholders may have accepted the offer as a result of the
deception alleged, and.., others may have failed to vote as a result of the notice,
thus losing their right to seek appraisal for the fair value of their shares. The
central question common to all of the minority shareholders is that of deception,
and in our opinion this issue outweighs the minor variations among the stockhold-
ers based on the degree of reliance upon the notice of meeting.... mhe utility of
Rule 23 would be destroyed if a class action were denied simply because all of the
allegations of the class did not fit together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. 94
Similarly, in Feder v. Harrington,95 the court utilized a subsection (b)(3)
approach in satisfying the typicality requirement. The case was brought by a
stockholder against a corporation and its officers who had made a tender offer
containing untrue statements and omissions of material facts upon which
plaintiff had relied in tendering her shares. The court, for all practical pur-
poses, ignored the typicality requirement in its examination of subsections
(a)(3) and (b)(3), stating, "[T]he class issues will predominate if the comtlaint
alleges a common course of conduct over a period of time, directed against
the members of the class, generally relied upon, and violating common statu-
tory provisions. ' '% The fact that individual stockholders had tendered their
stock for varying reasons was found to be overshadowed by defendant's
fraudulent actions, which were common to all stockholders.
As these cases suggest, subsection (a)(3) retains little independent signif-
icance. As one commentator notes,
89. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
90. See Class Actions, supra note 32, at 133.
91. 288 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd, 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
92. Id. at 60.
93. 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1969).
94. Id.
95. 52 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
96. Id. at 183.
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Since most plaintiffs' claims have arisen from the same transaction or same type of
transaction, the typicality requirement has generally been found satisfied. In fact,
those cases which have found plaintiff's claim to be atypical have generally in-
volved situations where all the claims were sufficiently different that common
questions did not predominate as required by Rule 23(b)(3). 97
The equation of typicality with rule 23(b)(3) once again supports the view that
the typicality requirement has no independent significance.
III. THE TYPICALITY REQUIREMENT: INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE
Some courts have rejected the theory that the rule 23(a)(3) typicality
requirement is dependent upon the other requirements of rule 23 and have
sought to give it independent meaning. The first attempt to do so was in White
v. Cates Rubber Co.,98 an employment discrimination action. The White court
rejected all previous approaches to the treatment of typicality and stated that
the requirement "must" be given an independent meaning.99 Although the
court did not explain the necessity of finding independent significance, it did
articulate its standard for meeting the typicality requirement: "A... reason-
able reading of the requirement would seem to entail the necessity of demon-
strating that there are other members of the class who have the same or
similar grievances as the plaintiff."''°
The Tenth Circuit subsequently adopted the White approach in Taylor v.
Safeway Stores, Inc.,01 another employment discrimination case. In its opin-
ion, the court accepted "White's compelling reasoning that subsection (a)(3)
must have a meaning independent of the other provisions of Rule 23(a),"' ' 02
but, like the White court, failed to articulate its reasoning for the necessity of
this interpretation. The Taylor court also ruled that a class member must
comply with the typicality requirement by showing the existence of a class
with actual grievances, stating, "[I]t is not unreasonable to require the plain-
tiff to establish the existence of a class as preliminary to the court's compari-
son of claims and defenses."' 3 It would be unrealistic for a court to compare
the claims and defenses of the plaintiff with the hypothetical claims of a
hypothetical class. Under this ruling, the class representative was also re-
quired to show compliance with the typicality requirement before proceeding
to discovery.
Very few other jurisdictions have followed the White and Taylor courts'
interpretations of typicality,'04 most likely because there are several serious
97. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail And Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions And The Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 844 (1974).
98. 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
99. Id. at 415.
100. Id. See also text accompanying notes 104-112 infra.
101. 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
102. Id. at 270.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1975); Jamerson v. Board of
Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 80 F.R.D. 744 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
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flaws in those opinions. Both courts expressed the view that typicality
"must" be accorded independent significance and equal status with the other
requirements of rule 23, but neither cited any source to substantiate this
assertion. As was noted, rule 23 originally contained only the numerosity,
commonality, and adequate representation requirements.'05 The White and
Taylor courts, however, offered no explanation of why the typicality require-
ment was added or what is entailed in meeting this prerequisite. However, as
Professor Moore has observed:
A reasonable meaning can be ascribed [to the typicality requirement] by observing
that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites describe four analytical steps which focus upon
sequential sets of concrete facts, relationships, and requirements. All these over-
lap but are essential preconditions to structuring the controversy for judicial reso-
lution. 106
Nevertheless, this writer contends that the White and Taylor courts
should have examined the interrelationships between all the rule 23(a) prere-
quisites before according the typicality requirement independent status.
t 7
The rationale behind having prerequisites is to ensure that the rights of class
members will be protected. Other requirements in rule 23 adequately protect
those rights. Typicality merely duplicates those requirements.
At one level, requiring that a prospective class member demonstrate that
he has grievances that are the same as or similar to those of other class
members gives the rule no independent meaning. One must prove the same
thing in complying with the (a)(2) commonality requirement. In this respect,
the White-Taylor standard for meeting the typicality requirement is no dif-
ferent from the treatment accorded the requirement by those courts"° that
have failed to lend the requirement any independent meaning.
At a second level, though, the White and Taylor rationales have in fact
added a new requirement to rule 23 in their attempts to show the independent
significance of the typicality requirement: a prospective class representative
must show the actual, not hypothetical, existence of a class having grievances
in common with that of the representative. ' 9 Nowhere in rule 23 or its
advisory committee notes is there a requirement that there be a showing of
actual claims."0 Furthermore, such a showing would be contrary to the
primary purpose of the class action. The class action is a tool of convenience,
and the requirements of rule 23(a) are present to protect the interests of class
members. If the requirement of showing the actual existence of a class having
105. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
106. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.06-2, at 23-191 (2d ed. 1980).
107. See Note, Procedure-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)-Typicality Requirement for Class Ac-
tions Reviewed. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975), 80 DICK. L. REV. 835, 839 (1975).
108. See text accompanying notes 32-97 supra.
109. See Note, Procedure-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)-Typicality Requirement for Class
Actions Reviewed. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975), 80 DICK. L. REV. 835, 839
(1975).
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Advisory Committee Note.
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grievances common to those of the proposed class representative had been
made a part of rule 23, many actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 could never have been successfully litigated."' This additional require-
ment also places a heavier burden upon a class representative because it
would require that he spend considerable time, effort, and money locating
class members. Furthermore, the requirement that this be accomplished prior
to beginning discovery is contrary to the weight of authority; discovery, an
essential part of establishing class claims, would be severely limited by the
White-Taylor requirement."
2
In sum, the attempts by the White and Taylor courts to give the typicality
requirement an independent meaning are dismal failures. The only plausible
independent significance of the requirement is that it acts as a double safe-
guard to ensure that the rights of class members will be adequately protected.
Typicality, however, is unnecessarily duplicative of the other requirements of
rule 23.
IV. RULE 23 SHOULD BE AMENDED
To avoid future confusion, rule 23 should be amended either to eliminate
or to define precisely the typicality requirement. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted a proposed rule which
would eliminate the typicality requirement. Section 1 of its Uniform Class
Action Act"' provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all in a class action if:
(1) the class is so numerous or so constituted that joinder of all members,
whether or not otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable; and
(2) there is a question of law or fact common to the class."14
The adequate representation requirement appears in section 2(b) of the Act:
"The court may certify an action as a class action, if it finds that... the
representative parties fairly and adequately will protect the interests of the
class."
5
The proposal would protect absent class members and sustain the viabil-
ity of the class action without imposing a typicality requirement. It would not
pose any substantial problems since most courts have treated the typicality
requirement along with one of the other requirements of rule 23." ' Thus, the
typicality requirement is unnecessary. Further, the other three prerequisites
of rule 23 are adequate safeguards to protect class members.
111. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 395 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Tex. 1975). See also text accom-
panying notes 35-36 supra.
112. See Class Actions, supra note 32, at 139.




116. See text accompanying notes 32-97 supra.
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An alternative to eliminating the typicality requirement would be to give
the requirement a precise meaning, one that is independent of the other re-
quirements for bringing a class action. However, this writer has no sugges-
tions as to what that definition of typicality would be. All reasonable attempts
to give the typicality requirement independent meaning have resulted in du-
plication of the other requirements. Therefore, the more reasonable alterna-
tive would be to eliminate the typicality requirement from rule 23.
V. CONCLUSION
The class action has been plagued with problems since its inception.
While some of the problems, such as the binding effect of a class action on
class members and other procedural difficulties, have been resolved over
time, the addition of the typicality requirement by the 1966 revision of rule 23
has posed only problems. There has been considerable difficulty in ascertain-
ing what typicality means. It has been equated with the rule 23(a)(2) common-
ality requirement, the rule 23(a)(4) adequate representation requirement, and
the rule 23(b)(3) "predominance of common questions" requirement.
Attempts to give the typicality requirement independent meaning have
presented no unique definitions to help alleviate the confusion, but instead
have only further complicated existing difficulties.
Therefore, rule 23(a) should be amended to eliminate the typicality re-
quirement. The goal of ensuring that the rights of class members are adequate-
ly protected would be no less well served because other provisions of the rule
already overlap it and are sufficiently broad enough to protect all class mem-
bers. Unless some precise meaning can be ascribed to the typicality require-
ment, its elimination is the most practical and reasonable alternative.
Olger C. Twyner III
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